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Recently, senior decision makers and leaders, including the CNO, CMC, and SecNav,
have expressed a belief in the centrality of military innovation and adaptation, and
many commentators in think tanks and the press are promoting more military innova-
tion for future readiness. Implicitly or explicitly, enthusiasms for innovation usually
take one of the three following forms: emphasizing the nature of innovative thinking,
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the achievement of new innovations in military organizations, and establishing a cul-
ture of innovation.
These are overlapping issues. Recognizing their importance and talking about them is
an essential beginning, because all three are needed, and they are intertwined. In this
brief paper we intend to provide a discussion of, first, some aspects of the nature of in-
novation and why it is difficult; second, how successful organizations have innovated
and adapted in the past; and third, the nature of thinking and action that undergirds
innovation.
The Nature of Innovation
Doing things differently is difficult; but the heart of innovation is about first seeing
things differently which is just as hard. Both involve making decisions under uncertain-
ty and ambiguity, and embracing risk. There is a natural human instinct and inclination
to want certainty about the future, but predicting a future is like “driving in the dark” as
former Secretary of Navy Richard Danzig put it in 2011.  If we base our decision-mak-
ing on unrealistic assumptions about uncertainty, we are not likely to get things right.
In addition, trying to base innovation on a predictable future can lead to endless debate
because the discussions are unresolvable and will go on without end. Moreover, from
the record of the past, the consensus of experts will be unreliable. N. N. Taleb in The
Black Swan described the need to respond to unforeseeable events. P. E. Tetlock in Ex­
pert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? offered conclusive evidence that an expert’s
power of prediction ten years in the future was “worse than that of a dart throwing
monkey,” in other words, less reliable than a random choice.  
Regardless, battle-changing innovations do happen. Here are three ways to help us
cope with, perhaps even embrace, an unpredictable future:
Thinking about alternative futures. Thinking about alternative futures is a powerful
way of enabling decision-making under uncertainty pioneered by Herman Kahn, and
put into productive use by Andrew Marshall in many of his Office of Net Assessment
studies. The reward of exploring alternative futures is the chance to uncover and adopt
a strategy, new technologies, and new tactics suitable for all or most of them. For exam-
ple, our future with China may be collaboration, competition, confrontation, or differ-
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possible to design one fleet that imperfectly supports an adaptive maritime strategy to
keep the peace and support our East Asia allies.
Looking at historical trends. In addition to thinking about possible futures, looking at
our pasts and our history to identify trends can be a useful way to navigate the seas of
uncertainty. For example, the approach in Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations   is to
identify trends and constants in naval history. Because trends are likely to continue,
they can guide the development of new tactics and technologies. For example, the trend
toward smaller, faster, and more efficient computers and their growing applications is
one that has a profound influence on information warfare. “COTS” (commercial off-the-
shelf) technologies have had the biggest effect on computer technology. The same kind
of influence and eventual dominance of commercially developed control systems is now
affecting the growing power and flexibility of UAVs.
Studying successful innovations from the past.  Understanding the evolutionary pro-
cesses enabling innovation can be useful indicators of what might work in the future,
and how implementing innovation has proceeded, usually along a winding road. While
it is tempting to look to business for learning how to innovate, there is much to learn
from past innovation in many military organizations’ histories, indicating also that non-
linear forward progress is the norm for effecting innovations.  For example, aircraft
carriers were developed before their coming dominance at sea was fully appreciated.
Tanks had a checkered history: The British invented them; the French built high quality
ones in large numbers; but the Germans exploited their tactical advantages with a new
operational application, the Blitzkrieg. Vertical lift aircraft were notably inferior to pro-
peller and jet-propelled aircraft, yet they revolutionized air and ground warfare.  
Note that great achievements at the combat level usually require both new technologies
and new tactics, which are like two sides of a coin and often best enabled if guided by
new concepts and new ways of thinking. Leaders must learn how to marry the quite dif-
ferent personalities of technologists and seagoing officers to accomplish big
advancements.
Achieving Innovation in Military Organizations
Most innovations take place in organizations, or need organizations to generate new in-
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organizations age and grow (and most military organizations are both quite large and
old) they first develop routines, rules, and structures to improve efficiencies and get
things done, but then the rules and bureaucratic processes often take a life of their own
and multiply, resulting in organizational calcification.
As Secretary Gates perceptively noted in his discussion of why our bureaucracies often
fail:  “[L]eaders … often encounter entrenched cultures that make real change difficult,
as well as lower-level organizations resistant to guidance from the top, determined to
preserve their piece of the cake and their status. Trimming organizational deadwood
can be as challenging in the business world as in public institutions. It is a rare soul
who has not been frustrated and maddened by multiple business bureaucracies—not to
mention disastrous business decisions that cost jobs and create economic turmoil and
heartache.”
Commercial organizations and think tanks offer examples of innovative research
(RAND in the 1950s and the early Bell Labs come to mind), and they can provide im-
portant inputs to military organizations and innovations. We can undoubtedly learn
from how they organized and facilitated innovative research. But military organizations
are not think tanks, whose product is thought and writing. Military organizations must
also plan and act. Military organizations are different from commercial organizations,
too. Both have an important competitive/interactive aspect. Businesses gain and main-
tain competitive advantages by making and selling competitive products. Military orga-
nizations need to gain and maintain competitive advantages too, but they are designed
to destroy an enemy’s will to fight and his means of war. Despite the differences, there
are things we can learn from studying the organizational mechanisms that have suc-
cessfully supported innovation in different contexts, such as reducing administrative
overhead, decentralizing the decision-making, and trying to avoid empowering middle
managers with too many layers of approval. An example of the relevance of this ap-
proach in a military organization was Commandant and General Al Gray’s transforma-
tion of the USMC with a maneuver warfare way of thinking.  He worked toward freeing
up the people with ideas and protecting them from paperwork and bureaucracy. We
also note that Secretary Mattis’ emphasis on combat readiness is intended to free peo-
ple from unnecessary training and administration.
Organizations have adapted to changes in warfare in the past, as we suggested above
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tions were not merely passive responses to change: many proactively created changes
in warfare. Speaking about uncertainty and risk, someone once said, “If you can predict
the future then I can’t change it.” Interestingly, many of the most important innova-
tions helped shape a future by imposing change on the enemy, exploiting enemy weak-
nesses, and building on our strengths.
Successful past innovations were often focused geographically with a specific enemy in
mind. For example, the development of Marine amphibious assault doctrine and the
vessels to achieve it grew out of Major Earl “Pete” Ellis’ study of the Pacific Islands and
atolls the Marines knew they would have to seize in the event of war with Japan. The
Israeli Navy swiftly developed small missile combatants armed with Gabriel missiles
after the sinking (in 1967) of the destroyer Eilat with ASCMs fired from small, Soviet-
built, Egyptian-operated, Osa and Komar missile boats. In just six years from a cold
start, the Israeli Navy obtained the ships and trained crews to defeat the Egyptian and
Syrian navies in the 1973 War. It was a great shock to the enemy and changed the na-
ture of naval war in coastal waters.
The Importance of Nurturing Innovative Thinkers
Not everyone in the organization should be an innovative thinker. Many must excel in
planning with existing capabilities and fighting. Most people prefer to do what they
know they do best, and they can often easily measure and see the results of their work.
Innovative thinking requires experimenting with what one does not know best and
sometimes not at all. The fruits of such work are often more distant and uncertain. Or-
ganizations, to be adaptive, need both exploration with new ideas and ways of thinking
(leading to new capabilities in the long run) and exploitation of existing ones. A prob-
lem arises when planners do not appreciate the necessary contribution of a few pre-
cious disruptive and innovative thinkers.  But if innovators alone dominate, then
there is no one to plan the development, implementation, and tactics to exploit an inno-
vation, often in ways quite different from the original intent.  Leaders must know how
to recognize, nurture, and listen to innovative thinkers and suppress bureaucratic im-
pediments to “thinking differently.”
How do our organizations attract and make room for them, and cultivate innovators in
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and fostering the careers of the future Arleigh Burkes, Al Grays, and Hyman Rickovers
who have bold ideas. A few relevant aspects:
Recognizing and making room for disruptive talent. There is a great need to be open
to creative individuals, those with ideas that may challenge the system and managers at
times. As Colonel John Boyd noted in his testimony on military transformation: “First,
we need to understand that throughout history the difference between brilliantly per-
forming armies and mediocre ones has always depended on a small handful of combat
leaders. Naturally, the military that manages to nurture a tiny handful of brilliant, inno-
vative officers .. achieves great results… On the other hand, a military that suppresses
said brilliant and unconventional young officers among them, who I might add tend to
make life uncomfortable for seniors, is forced to grind out rigid, predictable battles with
much blood and mountains of material.”  
Creating unusual mixing. One can help fight against the organizational bureaucratic
inertia by mixing teams of people in unconventional ways. Doing so demands creative
leadership because there are centripetal forces at work. People gravitate toward those
who are most like themselves, but we often learn more by interacting with those unlike
ourselves. In academic and military educational institutions, leaders can take proactive
roles in “mixing” people who may otherwise gravitate toward the institutional and intel-
lectual comfort of those with the same beliefs.
The concepts and words we use matter. Successful military slogans like “distributed
lethality” applied by the Surface Navy today has shown the way to innovative develop-
ment in an organization that leads to unified technological and tactical development.
“Attack effectively first” is another simple slogan of naval warfare with many ap-
plications that have been verified by past success in battle. The slogan has many nu-
anced implications and is a clue to how to win at sea today. It can guide technological,
tactical, and organizational development in the future. The Revolution in Military Af-
fairs is another identifier of technologies and tactics that had profound effects on all
modern warfare and a concept that was intended to also emphasize the underlying in-
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Innovation cannot be reduced to a check-off list, a blueprint, or a manual to guide cre-
ativity. Military doctrine manuals provide for unified strategic planning and tactical co-
operation. That is different from innovation. Contrast Edison’s development of the elec-
tric light bulb with the multifaceted development of the Polaris submarine and missile
under the leadership of CNO Arleigh Burke, who had the inspired idea,  the actions by
Red Raborn in developing the missile, and Hyman Rickover in developing the subma-
rine. Contrast both with the strange history of the development the tank in 1917 and its
several applications to armored warfare. There is no one single process to guide
success.
However, there are things naval leaders can do to foster innovative thinking and make
their organizations more prepared to adopt new tactics and technology, including:
Guard against a no­defect mentality and fear of failure. The only way never to make a
mistake is to never make a decision, in other words to do nothing perfectly. Innovative
thinking will never be right all the time, so there has to be a system that encourages
variations in ideas in order to swiftly accept, adopt, and assimilate the good
variations.  Ironically, avoiding failures can lead to loss of opportunities to learn
from failures and evolve. The advancement of naval aviation in the 1920s and 1930s is a
case study in learning from false starts and failures while rapidly progressing to readi-
ness for World War II. Senior leaders must also actively protect disruptive thinkers.
Have organizational structures in place to recognize innovative thinking that doesn’t
fit the mold of preconception. The common mistake is preparing to fight the last war.
Instead when a promising advancement is discovered, create shortcuts under a sense of
urgency to get around the bureaucratic system. The early success of Navy Special
Projects offices in the 1950s illustrates this, and so does the empowerment of Rear Ad-
miral Wayne Meyer to develop the Aegis combat system by the Surface Navy leadership
of Vice Admiral James Doyle.  
Emphasize that the most important characteristic to foster innovation is people. Ad-
vancement comes not from processes; or disciplinary lenses, or the “how to” manuals,
or even advances in technology. The most important element in organizations and in
warfare is the human element. As former Marine Corps Commandant General Robert
Barrow noted, “In any institution or undertaking, the importance of people transcends
all else.”  Marine Combat University President General Bowers also noted (in his dis-
xviii
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cussion of Wilson and Barrow), “You can get everything else wrong, but if you get the
people right, you will be all right. Whereas you can get everything else right, but if you
get the people wrong, you are going to be in trouble.”  Leaders must proactively con-
strain middle managers who maintain the status quo with a “spreadsheet” mentality. 
Recognize and reward the best leadership styles. In addition to realizing that the most
important element is the people chosen, we need leaders who stick their necks out for
those willing to experiment and do things differently and provide top cover for the peo-
ple who are implementing the new ideas, technologies, and tactics. In particular, lead-
ers can help on issues such as: 
Experimentation. Experiment at sea with prototypes and first generation designs in the
full expectation that second and third generation designs must be built to correct the
early mistakes and smooth out shortcomings. Experiments can also lead to innovative
ways in how organizations think and fight. Marine Generals Al Gray and Charles Krulak
led many experiments in the early days of maneuver warfare before the concept was ful-
ly developed and adopted, experiments that were both intellectual, organizational, and
operational.  
Exploiting the creativity of youth by “getting out of the way.” Here are wise words re-
garding cyberwar from a Navy lieutenant: “The most talented graduate students at the
best U. S. computer science and engineering schools are said to be those who leave be-
fore graduation in order to pursue venture capital or other commercial opportunities . .
. [to pursue excellence in the Navy] administratively and organizationally reduce the
various forms of friction that would inhibit those [young] individuals and teams within
their cyber forces from innovating, developing, and deploying capabilities faster than
the adversary force.”  Talented youth will be prominent in cyber war evolution, just as
they rose to prominence in computer technology, as youthful combat leaders like
William B. Cushing and J. E. B. Stuart in wartime, or as youthful classical music com-
posers like W. A. Mozart and Felix Mendelssohn.
Building an organizational culture to support innovation and reward risk takers. It
goes without saying there are limits and achieving a balance is one of the most chal-
lenging skills of leadership. Nevertheless, it is a lot easier to suppress innovation and
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ple who are willing to take risks and protect the intelligent risk-takers from thoughtless
suppression because they are willing to dare.
Broadening peoples’ minds. Foster curiosity in the midst of good discipline. Cultivating
open minds is a key responsibility of our military educational institutions. Retired
VADM Patricia Tracey in an interview noted last year, while reflecting on her excep-
tional career, extolled her time in graduate school: “[E]ducation is about how does it all
fit together? . . . How might you think about doing things differently?  . . .  I say just that
time out in a thought-provoking environment to consolidate everything that you’ve ex-
perienced and draw meaning from it and expectations for what’s next . . . is invaluable
to somebody who’s at some point going to have to deal in massive uncertainty.”  The
University of Chicago under Robert Hutchins actively promoted broad reading that
helped broaden civilian minds. Military innovative thinkers such as General Gray and
Secretary Mattis are famously avid (and broad) readers. Mattis said in 2003 when
asked about the importance of reading, that while reading doesn’t give you all the an-
swers, it lights up the path ahead and enables us to understand and learn from the
past.
Conclusion
Secretary Danzig’s metaphor of “driving in the dark” is very relevant to the road to im-
prove innovation amidst uncertainty, and it will not be a straight highway. Yet, not-
withstanding the difficult nature of innovation and the inhibiting organizational pro-
cesses that often suppress it, past successes suggest that we can indeed nurture innova-
tors and grow innovations in the U.S. Navy. This will unavoidably accompanied by
bruising the status quo ways of thinking. We have not discussed every aspect of success.
Further dimensions to explore include how our educational institutions must help build
more innovative and interdisciplinary thinking, and examining past attempts to inno-














 We dedicate this paper to Andrew W. Marshall, who continues to inspire us and who has tirelessly worked to improve in-
novation and innovative thinking in our organizations. We are grateful for the comments from Jim March, BGen William
Bowers, VADM Ronald Route, and Andy Marshall on an earlier draft. Any remaining errors were produced without help.
 We should also mention that while we draw mostly on Navy and USMC examples, other services have also begun impor-
tant discussions on the topic, see for example: https://www.army.mil/article/173386/making_innovation_happen
 Although our paper is largely conceptual in order to provide insights into the dynamics making innovation difficult but
possible, we also include some practical examples / anecdotes on the basis of past success. Obviously, more research and
reflections on the topic is needed, but we hope to indicate at least part of foundation and some fruitful lines along which
progress can be made.
 See, R. Danzig : “Driving in the Dark”, available here: https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/driving-in-the-dark-
ten-propositions-about-prediction-and-national-security
 Military leaders have also made similar points. Robert Gates for instance noted to West Point cadets: “When it comes to
predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have
never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more —
we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.” Secretary Jim Mattis (then General) also
noted in a testimony to the arms services committee in 2011: “I think, as we look toward the future, I have been a horrible
prophet. I have never fought anywhere I expected to in all my years.” These (and other) examples of our prediction capa-
bilities noted here: http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/16/100-right-0-of-the-time/
 Forces for such a strategy must demonstrate that we can deny China’s commerce and sink the PLA’s warships in its own
home waters with a capability that takes the offensive in China’s Seas with highly distributable forces.
 Naval Institute Press, April 2018
 In particular given that the organizations ability to experiment and adapt to new innovations may be quite different in
business and military organizations. This is not to say that we don’t think there is plenty to be learned from business orga-
nizations – for example, minimizing red tape, bureaucratic chain reactions and paperwork is clearly something business is
better at. But when it comes to understanding how to implement innovations, as well as understanding the dynamics of
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useful information (see, for instance, Williamson Murray and Allan Millet’s book on “Military Innovation in the Interwar
Period”).
 Other examples include: Nuclear ICBM’s changed all aspects of warfare. Cruise Missiles are teaming with and sometimes
replacing strike aircraft because of their great range and endurance. UAV’s and Autonomous Aerial Vehicles combined
with cyber warfare technologies are changing the nature of warfare as we write.
 R. Gates (2016): A Passion for Leadership, p. 5.




 This also implies that we must spend a great deal of time trying to understand how our opponents think and how their
organizations work, in addition to observing what they do.
 Organization scholar James March has long warned that this is a typical ‘competency trap’ of organizations and that we
should pay particular attention to trying to nurture and nudge those willing to explore (see J. March, “Exploration and Ex-
ploitation in organizational learning”, Organization Science, 1991).
 Designer of Predator, Abraham Karem, noted that his drones were built for the cold war, but its various employments
has expanded seemingly without limit. https://www.airspacemag.com/flight-today/the-man-who-invented-the-predator-
3970502/
 As Colonel John Boyd noted in his testimony on military transformation: “First, we need to understand that throughout
history the difference between brilliantly performing armies and mediocre ones has always depended on a small handful of
combat leaders. Naturally, the military that managers nurture a tiny handful of brilliant, innovative officers combat com-
mand achieves great results. … On the other hand, a military that suppresses said brilliant and unconventional young offi-
cers among them, who I might add tend to make life uncomfortable for seniors, is forced to grind out rigid, predictable bat-
tles with much blood and mountains of material.” The testimony available here: https://www.c-span.org/video/?17753-
1/us-military-reform-oper-desert-storm
 Another example is the maneuver warfare of ideas, for years debated and discussed among Marines including writing
(in a series of Gazette articles), to help clarify important dimensions of the concepts and ideas.
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 As quoted in “Commandants of the Marine Corps”, edited by Allan Millet and Jack Shulinson, US Naval Institute Press,
2004, p. 456.
 See BGen Bowers lecture on USMC commandants Wilson and Barrow and the reforms they led: https://www.youtube.-
com/watch?v=aJZCBg_SDLY
 A panel discussion of the history and some relevant aspects of maneuver thinking is available here: https://www.y-
outube.com/watch?v=RL4__NVYByw
 LT. T. B. Meadors (USN), First Gain the Victory: Six Strategic Considerations for Naval Cyber Forces, 2017, prepared
for and disseminated by VADM Jan Tighe, USN, Deputy CNO for Information Warfare and Director of Naval Intelligence,
p. 7.
 Military Operations Research, V22, N1, 2017; page 75.
 http://www.strifeblog.org/2013/05/07/with-rifle-and-bibliography-general-mattis-on-professional-reading/. A great
discussion of the importance of broad reading in the military profession in general is P. v. Riper (2006): “The Relevance of
History to the Military Profession: An American Marine’s View”. In W. Murray & H. Sinnrich (eds): The Past as Prologue.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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